There is a long-standing joke that behavioral scientists have physics envy. For good reason-physicists have created remarkably comprehensive and precise theories of the physical universe. Present-day cognitive neuroscience shares more similarities with eighteenth and nineteenth century biology than with biology and physics as practiced in the late, very late, twentieth century. The sign of a relatively young science is to catalogue any objects under its purview-what one might call Linnean science. Biology in its nascent stage was of this type but it transcended its infancy with the theory of evolution. Cognitive neuroscience is still in search of its Darwin.
Without question, we have made enormous advances in our understanding of human brain function. A key cause of this great increase in our knowledge has been the development of noninvasive functional brain imaging techniques such as evoked potentials (EPs), positron emission tomography (PET), magentoencephalography (MEG), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). One assumption that these methods make is that discrete areas underlie information processing in the brain and are functionally specialized (see Churchland & Sejnowski, 1988) . As important as this Linnean or stamp collecting phase is, cognitive neuroscience needs to go beyond it. Before the Einstein or Darwin of cognitive neuroscience can emerge in the third millennium, he or she will require precise information about the temporal characteristics of how various brain regions coordinate their activity.
One possible approach is to apply mental chronometry to functional neuroimaging. Mental chronometric tasks have been used extensively in cognitive science and more recently in cognitive neuroscience (Posner, 1978; Georgopoulos, Taira, & Lukashin, 1993) . Such tasks often use reaction time as a measure of processing load to indirectly elucidate the mechanisms re-
